1960 - 1964 - locksmith, Kazan

1964 - 1969, 1973 - 1983 - in the internal affairs bodies of Kazan and the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tatarstan.

1983 - 1988 - head of department in the central office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

1988 - 1992 - First Deputy (Deputy) Ministers of Internal Affairs of Armenia and Russia

1992 - 1995 - Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia

since 1995 - Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

Viktor Erin is one of the prominent figures in the galaxy of interior ministers. Firstly, he is a professional and by the time of his appointment as minister he had already worked for 27 years in various roles in the internal affairs bodies. He went through many steps, studied the system from the inside, and not by hearsay. Secondly, he was a minister, although not so much - three and a half years, that is, one-fifth of the term, for example, of Shchelokov's tenure, but by the standards of the troubled transitional period, it was quite long. Especially when you consider that six years before his appointment (1986 - 1991) in the USSR and Russia six ministers changed kaleidoscopically - Vlasov, Bakatin, Pugo, Barannikov, Trushin, Dunaev. And Kulikov, appointed after him, also had a chance to work for a shorter period. So, of all the interior ministers of recent times, history has provided Yerin with the opportunity to prove himself in the post of minister to a greater extent than others. Against this background, he is almost an aksakal.

Previously, many interior ministers were not awarded any titles. For Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria, Stalin introduced special titles - General Commissioner of State Security. Since the time of Kruglov and Shchelokov, the tradition of conferring military ranks on the ministers of the interior has somehow taken root.

With regard to Erin, this issue was resolved as follows. On April 20, 1993, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Dunaev signed a document addressed to the head of the state legal department of the Presidential Administration of Russia Kotenkov with a request to include in the list of military posts replaced by senior officers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the post of minister with the establishment of the military rank "General of the Army" ... Motivation - the minister directly leads the internal troops. The proposal fell on fertile ground and was supported. On October 1, 1993, Erin, who previously had the special rank of Colonel-General of Internal Service, becomes a person with the military rank of General of the Army.

Moreover, he received the rank of general, like his predecessor Barannikov, rapidly rapidly: 1989 - Major General of the Militia; 1991 - Lieutenant General of the Police; less than 9 months later, on May 19, 1992 - Colonel General of the Internal Service; in the next 1993 - army general. The result is four general ranks in four years. Barannikov, as mentioned above, covered the same road in three years.

Again, for comparison, let us recall that Khrushchev, in four years of work as Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, did not confer any titles on the builder Dudorov, and Tikunov, who later worked as a minister in Russia, although he also led the internal troops and had the military rank of colonel before being appointed minister, for five years of successful work he received only the special rank of general of the internal service of the second rank, in other words - lieutenant general, two big stars. And that's all, period. Although it is now fashionable to criticize the Soviet regime, for objectivity

In total, Erin worked in Armenia for two years - 1988 - 1990. The author has no reliable information about the true reasons for the termination of his work there. I have also heard different, more critical assessments about Yerin's work in Armenia. Here is what, for example, General Aslakhanov, the author of several books, President of the Association of Law Enforcement Agencies of the Russian Federation, said.

When we worked together as heads of departments in the GUBKHS of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs with Yerin, he constantly tried to emphasize that he was the most literate person. Since Yerin was the head of the headquarters department, and Barannikov and I were the heads of the branch departments, all the fundamental documents went upstairs through Yerin. Sometimes he would correct a few words in the document, for example, instead of “however,” he would write “along with that,” or something similar that did not make any changes in substance. But he reports to Demidov that, they say, I have worked, and the document has begun to play. He could easily set us up, show that he is smart, and we are all fools. He could tell a tale, shit. It was in his blood. How many people broke their backs just because they did not like Erin, and Demidov as a leader was rather tough.

Then Erin, the narrator continued, was assigned to Armenia. But if he is so smart, then at least once he spoke out against separatist sentiments in Armenia, against the illegal policy that was carried out there. No. He sat there quieter than water, below the grass, praising the highest Armenian culture. You, they say, do not even have sobering-up centers, I am delighted with what a clean nation.

Later, already being the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, Erin put forward the idea of ​​creating an MBVD in Russia.

But he refuses it.

No. This is true. Barannikov did not have such thoughts, he was from the category of hard workers. If he was given a department, then he will work without raising his head and do everything so that there is order, for the system to work. And Erin is an improviser. The Ministry of Internal Affairs owes many reorganizations to him. After all, he thinks of himself that he knows where and what structure should be. Barannikov himself told me that this was Viktor Fedorovich's idea, and I supported him. Moreover, Bakatin once called, who at that time was the head of the allied KGB, and expressed his insult that he had not been consulted on this issue. He knew nothing about the reorganization, although in essence he did not object to such a merger.

In such an environment, I, as the chairman of the committee of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, did everything to make the decision on the MBVD canceled. But Erin by this time had gained great confidence in Yeltsin and became the Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia. Barannikov, being a minister, made a mistake when he often gave him freedom of action, pushing him to the front line. Erin took advantage of this, - concluded Aslakhanov.

When Erin returned from Armenia to Moscow, no one immediately offered him a new job in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. This went on for several months. Meanwhile, we will remind, now the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, created in 1989, already existed. By this time, Barannikov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR instead of Trushin. He, forming his team, invited Erin to become the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR in order to oversee the criminal block. After some time, Viktor Fedorovich becomes the first deputy minister. In this role, he met the events of August 1991. Erin says that in order to protect the White House and the new Russian government during the GKChP period, they sent a telegram to send cadets with weapons from several police schools to Moscow, which the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in particular, Deputy Minister Trushin opposed in every possible way. Erin, however, even now considers the call of these schools to Moscow to be fully justified.

Have you ever met, Vasily Petrovich, with other persons who were subsequently also the ministers of the interior of Russia? In particular, with Dunaev and Erin?

There were almost no contacts with Dunaev, except for one. When he was the head of the Vologda Department of Internal Affairs and an inspection was being carried out, I came to Vologda to sum up the results of the inspection. This inspection ended relatively calmly. Dunaev had good relations with the first secretary of the regional party committee and he supported him well. At the same time, there was some talk in the corridors of the ministry that Dunaev was behind some unseemly cases from the North Caucasus when he worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Checheno-Ingushetia and Dagestan.

I met Yerin after he was appointed to the post of First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Armenia. There are ripe events on Nagorno-Karabakh and others. But either Erin was artificially pushed away from these events, or he himself did not really fit into them, but he did not show himself brightly there. And according to the assessment of the late Minister of Internal Affairs of Armenia Shahinyan, as well as other persons, he was more in these events, and not in them.

Subsequently, I almost never met with him. During the August events of 1991, at night we had a telephone conversation with him with manifestations of human rudeness. In response to my actions, which I took as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he, being the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, behaved insolently, in a boorish manner. Although before, he always emphatically showed external respect and honor.

Tell me, in fact, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia came out by this time from under the influence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR?

Formally, this influence seemed to exist, but in essence the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia carried out those commands that came not from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, but from the first leaders of Russia.

Earlier, I was present at the imposition of a special position and curfew in Yerevan and Baku. I saw what difficult relations arise between the army and the militia at this time. In both cases, there were losses when the curfew was imposed. Since the army took power into its own hands during the curfew, the losses were mainly from the militia. I understood that the same could have happened in August 1991. If our young cadets with weapons from the police schools, who, on the orders of Barannikov and Yerin, were sent to Moscow, come across with the same young conscripts, but with armored personnel carriers and tanks, then bloodshed between them will be sure. Therefore, Pugo's order not to allow these police schools to enter Moscow coincided with my inner understanding and mood. I tried to instill the same understanding in a telephone conversation with Erin. But he, apparently, was blinded by the fact that the weight of Russia at that moment was heavier than the weight of the Union. Quantitatively, this all accumulated along all lines, and then led to the Belovezhskaya agreements, concluded Trushin.

Viktor Fedorovich also told about such episodes. On August 19, 1991, Barannikov fell ill (not diplomatically, but in reality, his heart was grabbing). Erin remained on the farm in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. On the morning of that day, Pugo invited him to his place, asked if he knew about the establishment of the Emergency Committee in the country, and also

About the circumstances of Pugo's death. There were three of them in the apartment that morning: he, his wife and his wife's father, already in old age and with health problems. And above them lives the son of Pugo - Vadim with his wife. Perhaps the death of Pugo could have been prevented, but perhaps a tragic mistake was made. One leader from the KGB called him and said that we would like to meet with you and have a talk. Pugo was an intelligent man and immediately guessed that in conditions when some members of the State Emergency Committee had already been detained, we are talking about his actual arrest. Erin himself says that he, as an operative, offered another option. “Let’s,” Yerin said, “I’ll play along in this matter: I’ll go to him for negotiations myself. Taking into account our normal relations, Pugo will have no objections, and then I will tell him calmly, in everyday life, that, Boris Karlovich, you are sorry, but we have to go. And nothing will happen. And the call will scare him away. It can happen between the call and arrival

Ivanchenko, Erin and Yavlinsky left for Pugo's apartment. (By the way, when the author tried to find out why, along with the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs officers, Yavlinsky had to go there, no one, including Erin, could answer it intelligibly. Maybe he was connected to counterbalance the security forces?) By all accounts, no one left Pugo's apartment. When

Erin believes that events could have developed as follows. Pugo was the first to shoot himself, while his wife was in the kitchen. She ran to the shot, and since earlier the decision to leave their lives at the same time was made, she out of inexperience distorted the slide of the pistol from which Boris Karlovich shot himself (while the cartridge was removed from the chamber, and he ended up on the floor). Valentina Ivanovna shoots herself. Erin's version, however, does not coincide with the conclusion of the Prosecutor's Office, which believes that Pugo first shot his wife, and then himself. But who knows now how it really was? The couple took this secret with them. We can only guess and build versions.

In general, Erin explains his position in the events of August 1991 as follows: by that time he was one of the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and was obliged to ensure public order and security in the country, including the Government and the White House, where the deputies of the Supreme Soviet gathered. The employees of the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs apparatus found themselves in a difficult situation, it was impossible to understand them, they themselves did not know what to do. Some tried to distance themselves from Pugo, who became a member of the Emergency Committee, and secretly called the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs that we were with you. Others, on the contrary, spitefully said: wait, the State Emergency Committee will now take power, and then we will deal with you. All this was understandable and stemmed from everyone's understanding of the situation. Some were extremely upset that

After the events of August 1991, Barannikov, as you know, was moved by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. There he took with him the first deputy of the now allied minister and Erin. Dunaev became the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR for several months.

I ask Erin to comment on the issue of his participation in the development of the idea of ​​uniting the security and internal affairs departments, which was already mentioned above. Viktor Fedorovich says that the situation in the security agencies by this time was not easy. Back in 1991 - early 1992, Bakatin was smashing them, and then and then there were forces that constantly inspired the President with the idea that these bodies in the form in which they were, must be done away with. At the same time, it was clear to the professionals that the state cannot function without such a structure. And Barannikov was very close to the President, enjoyed his respect and complete trust at that time. The President asked for suggestions on this issue. Erin was also involved in the preparatory work. Then the idea was born

At the same time, there could be significant cost savings: instead of two apparatuses, one with the combination of parallel structures (operational-technical, financial, economic, and others). In addition, within one system, the issues of interaction between security and internal affairs bodies could be provided much more efficiently. It was thought that one of the first deputy ministers would lead the block of state security structures and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs would not interfere here. At the same time, Erin, contrary to the above statement of Dunaev, says that he never claimed to be the leader of this bloc.

Another first deputy minister would be in charge of the department of services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, due to the unification, the strengthening of the internal affairs bodies would also be achieved, including in special equipment. All these issues were repeatedly discussed at joint meetings with the heads of the Ministry of Security, and they also agreed, realizing that there was an ax hanging over them, and what was proposed was the way to save the organs, to escape from the pressure of both politicians and the public. , mass media.

However, when the decision was already made at the very top, the same political forces got scared - they created, they say, a monster. This is where the appeal to the Constitutional Court about the legality of the decision came from. The Constitutional Court, according to Erin, at that time was politicized to a certain extent thanks to the light hand of its former head Valery Zorkin, a graduate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As a result, the Constitutional Court upheld the position of seemingly democratic forces about the inexpediency of such a union, and the scheme was rejected. Barannikov remained at the head of the Ministry of Security.

And by that time, something had not gone well with Dunaev, as a minister, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was rumored that Dunaev's behavior was not perceived by both the President's entourage and himself. First, Dunaev resigned, and then Erin was appointed minister. Dunaev took it rather painfully. His

The new minister got down to work. He says that not long before that the Law on Militia was adopted, there were a lot of issues that had to be solved. It was necessary to preserve a system that was wobbling and falling apart. There was a rapid outflow of personnel, which somehow had to be suspended. Organized crime caused an unprecedented surge and threats, therefore new structures were created and it was necessary to make them work. For the training of personnel, it was required to strengthen the system of educational institutions, part

They proclaimed the creation of a public security police, which meant that it had to be created, transferred to the local budget, which is very difficult. On February 12, 1993, the President issued a decree “On the Public Security Militia (Local Militia) in the Russian Federation”. As a result of the implementation of this Decree, the number of the public security police in 1993 increased by 84.5 thousand units, or by a quarter. In general, the local militia by the beginning of 1994 across the country was formed at 73 percent of the established number and amounted to 442 thousand units. At the same time, in 33 republics, territories and regions the number of local police units did not reach even 70 percent of the standards stipulated by the Presidential Decree.

The police alone will not cope with the maintenance of public order and the fight against crime. However, the entire old prevention system had collapsed by this time. The levers of influence on society along the lines of the party and Soviet authorities also collapsed. It was necessary to look for a replacement for all this, to turn the local heads of administration to these problems. We polemicize:

Some say they have collapsed, while others have destroyed, because they pushed well, starting with Yeltsin, the Belovezhskaya agreements and so on.

If a significant part of the work rested on the party power, and it, this party power, was falling apart, then how to assess: did it collapse or was it destroyed? If they say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union collapsed artificially, then we will assume that it collapsed. If we state that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union failed to retain power and found itself rotten to the core at its top, failed to retain such a great power, then the assessments will probably be different.

But if we look out the window now, then we also did not come to a bright one, ordinary people live not better, but worse.

Yes, there are many troubles. And that we, as professionals, didn’t understand that the transition to a market economy would cause completely new economic and criminal processes? We were not born yesterday, we saw the Western experience of transition to the market. It's one thing when we defended the socialist economy and property. It's another matter when this economy and socialist property simply disappeared. Private property appeared. There were hotheads who said that the BKHS apparatus now needed to be completely eliminated. Many did not immediately come to the understanding that in market conditions it was necessary to protect property, whatever it was, it was still impossible to steal. In the conditions of the wide existence of banking, various commercial structures, private traders were looking for ways to reform our service. But at the same time, they tried to maintain its focus on combating economic crimes. All this was not so simple, but it was necessary to do that too.

Therefore, I do not think that we in the Ministry of Internal Affairs have ruined everything. On the contrary, all efforts were aimed at preserving what was positive. We, for example, did not expel anyone from the positively proven personnel of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although the hotheads offered everyone under the broom, so that not one of those who worked under the leadership of Pugo, who became a supporter of the State Emergency Committee, would remain. An attempt was made to convey this idea to both the President and the Government. Therefore, I had to fight a lot, proving the inadmissibility of such an approach. Professional - he is a professional and will remain so in any formation. Another thing is, let us direct it and create normal conditions for work. Let him serve. After all, he serves not individuals, but the state, the interests of Russia. All this was not easy. Nevertheless, I believe that we have passed this path quite well. And people were not ditched, they retained a professional core, and managed to combine the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR more or less painlessly, without great losses, shocks and anger. It took a lot of effort in 1991-1992, but people started earning money on the sly.

It was necessary to think about how to financially support people in conditions of inflation, to index wages. As a minister, in any case, no one spat in my back for not supporting people. It was necessary to retain employees locally, especially managers, since the notorious phrase: “What did he do during the GKChP period, what telegrams did he receive and send?” - sounded everywhere. There were many attempts to frame the chiefs of the Internal Affairs Directorate, but we tried not to allow this. Many of them, at the meeting and now, express their gratitude for this, thank that they did not listen to slander, sometimes based only on emotions. Some people, among whom there were many crooks, were simply trying to take advantage of this situation. So the situation was very, very difficult. It was especially difficult in the first period, but then the system started working, - the minister concluded.

Erin, however, does not tell us anything about this side of the matter, but it is very significant. The new government with a generous hand went to a sharp increase in the administrative apparatus. The government of Russia, by its resolution on January 29, 1992, established the number of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the amount of 3400 units at the expense of 1500 units of its own number of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR (that is, an increase of almost 2.5 times !!!) and 1900 out of 2400 of the abolished Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Thus, of the entire USSR, only Russia remained, but the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the same time grew against the allied one at once by 1000 units !!! And this is not counting all the tricks by creating structures under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And if "at" - it means that it is no longer the central apparatus. In Soviet times, this was never even dreamed of. Then they begged from the Central Committee and the government bit by bit. Special battles were fought in the central office. For that Shchelokov was influential. But if he managed to literally knock out 10 - 15 units for some new structure in the central office not from the first call, then this was already considered a great victory. And here it is like manna from heaven.

Along with the professionals, people from the shrinking army and civilian organizations joined the offices of the central administrations. There is no time for competence - just to fill vacancies. All this was reflected in some places by the improvement of the business, but more often knowledgeable people, veterans note a sharp decline in professionalism, an increase in bureaucracy, a weakening of influence on places.

Previously, the main part of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Union was located on Zhitnaya Street, 16, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR - on Ogareva, 6. After such a decision, both buildings were instantly filled with the swollen structures of a single Ministry of Internal Affairs, but there are still not enough seats for officials, they complain that there are no separate offices ... There were 384 general posts alone.

In the earlier, not so distant times, the real title even for the allied deputy ministers of the interior, not to mention the Russian ones, was often the rank of lieutenant general. It was with this title that respected B.A. Viktorov, K.I. Nikitin, N.A. Rozhkov, B.V. Zabotin, N.I. Pilschuk, V.P. Petushkov, who worked as a total deputy and first deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 20 years (!) And others. Some well-characterized deputy ministers ended up with the rank of major general. It's not meant to be.

Now many have a destiny. Now not only the chiefs of the Main Directorates, but also of independent directorates are competing who will become a lieutenant general faster. Quite often, yesterday's colonel, who has fallen into the mainstream, becomes a multi-star general in favor before our very eyes. Only the head, alas, does not always, in its wisdom, keep up with such a dizzying growth. “Rather get the maximum rank yourself and quickly break through it for your entourage, seize the moment” - this was the motto of many bosses. Previously, they were at least stopped, reminded of their modesty, those who buried themselves were consulted either in the Central Committee, or elsewhere, and now there is no one. Only the taxpayer tightens his belt even tighter and swears obscenely.

For the entire period of Erin's work as a minister, the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs functioned in conditions of severe underfunding, lack of funds for solving priority tasks. There are constant alarming reports about this from the ministry to the President and the Government. So, on June 13, 1993, Erin reported to the president that in May of this year, the salaries were not paid to employees in the amount of 29 billion rubles. Remained unpaid bills in the amount of 127 billion rubles for food and other services. The Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated its minimum requirements for June 1993 at 149.9 billion rubles, but actually received 57 billion rubles, that is, slightly more than one third. A similar message was sent to the President on July 29, 1993.

Power is silent. Then the security officials, not yet accustomed to such despair, decided to join forces. In August of the same 1993, the President and Prime Minister of Russia received a joint appeal from the Ministry of Defense (Grachev), Ministry of Internal Affairs (Erin), MB (acting Minister Golushko) and Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of the Arzhavkin. It reported that due to the underfunding of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies, industrial enterprises carrying out defense orders, the most serious threat to the stability of the situation in the army and navy, in military units and bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a pre-strike situation in regions with a high concentration of defense industries was created. ... The debt in these areas by August 27, 1993 reached 2,300 billion rubles.

However, in Russia destroyed under the guise of democratization and plundered by the impudent “new Russians” with the blessing of the authorities (Chubais alone with all his adventures is worth something) there was no money for these needs. Privatization was in full swing, shameless initial accumulation of capital at any cost.

The situation has not changed even now, after 5-6 years, and it has become even worse. Russia, its law enforcement system, the Ministry of Internal Affairs are crumbling before our eyes. When V. Chernomyrdin, after another landslide crisis in August 1998, announced that during his five-month resignation Mamai allegedly passed through Russia, he was very cunning. This Mamai began his campaign even under Gaidar, then under him, Chernomyrdin, and only then under Kiriyenko. One thing is certain: at all times - under Yeltsin.

However, the upper echelons in July and August 1993, when they were contacted, were occupied by others. The president and his entourage were preparing to launch a powerful blow on parliament. And they did it in September-October. The siloviki, including Erin, gave distress signals, but served faithfully, even when very dubious decisions were put into effect, for which they were then personally treated kindly.

Thus, Viktor Fedorovich, what did you manage to do during the period of your work as a minister, and what did you fail?

I believe that, firstly, we managed to reform the system in principle, to transfer it to work in completely new conditions and state building and the economic situation, to fit it into these conditions. Further. We managed to preserve the professional core, which is very important, to create a system that works for the future in terms of training and retraining of personnel. We managed to create fundamentally new units that were needed to combat modern crime (reforming the structures for combating organized crime; the creation of SOBRs, about which there was also sweeping criticism that we are creating something incomprehensible, although life has shown that they are needed for detention of fundamentally new criminal groups).

Much, of course, failed. They failed to ensure that the employees of the internal affairs bodies felt worthy in this society both in terms of respectful public opinion and material reward for their hard work. There was support on all these issues, including from the President. Speaking, he himself said that we must do as in developed Western countries, where the policeman is a respectable and welcome groom, because he has the power of the state behind him, he is well prepared and provided for there. The economy has not given us the opportunity to do this yet. I understand that this takes years. Everything will depend on the further economic situation.

The most important thing, I think, is people at all levels. There is a strong chief of the Department of Internal Affairs or another structure, which means that the system works even in difficult conditions. I have fundamental disagreements here with some people who say that you need to create your own team, appoint your own people. I think this is nonsense. The team is not formed that way. I formed a team from what was. Practically, except for Dunaev, he did not change anyone. Yes, and Dunaev was changed because he himself flew into this option, they put me before a fact to clean up without talking.

The rest, everyone who worked in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (for example, Deputy Minister Strashko) and the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, continued to work. I managed to make a team out of them. And until now, no one told me that we had a bad team. We were like-minded people, although we could argue on issues of principle. But when a decision was made, everyone followed it.

Why was Deputy Minister Strashko then forced to leave the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and then return again under Stepashin?

Strashko was treated unfairly. Kulikov understood the process of forming a team in his own way: to find with whom I studied together, with whom I served, to arrange all of them, and this will be a team. It's a bullshit. Therefore, he appointed pensioners as chiefs of the Internal Affairs Directorate. Or to some special areas he appointed military men who were not prepared for this by past experience.

But A.S. Kulikov is, to a certain extent, also your team?

Yes, mine. On his site, he was a good, normal leader. I highly appreciated him as the commander of the internal troops. Yes, I know that in some ways he was not happy when I did not allow certain decisions that were contrary to the interests of other services to be completed. For me, as a minister, it was equally important that both systems work. Another thing is that, having become a minister, Kulikov carried out his changes. But these are already his problems. He, apparently, will consider himself right. But I believe that the team is formed on a professional basis.

When we talk about Barannikov and Dunaev's connections with Yakubovsky, Birshtein, I remind Yerin that he also signed documents on the broadest powers of “General Dima”. Explains that there really was a draft of such a document. Shumeiko was pushing him. This document was brought to Erin. Barannikov, as the Minister of Security, also asked to sign it. Erin seems to have said that here you can see a linden tree with the naked eye. Barannikov also understood this, promising to tell Shumeiko that this should not be done, nevertheless, he asked to endorse the document. Then Erin agreed, but wrote that it was only after the presentation of the regulation on this authorized government to coordinate the activities of all power structures. Then, as you know, with the help of the President, this idea died out safely.

On this, our conversations with Yerin essentially ended, except for two of his judgments, which have not yet been named, which I will talk about below, although I still had a lot of questions for him. Among the written list provided to him in advance, the following problems remained unanswered:

Assessment of the events of September - October 1993, the actions of the organs and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Could the shooting of the White House have been avoided?

Chechnya: what was assessed and done so, and what was wrong. Forecast for Chechnya.

Budyonnovsk - estimates today. The circumstances of the dismissal of the minister.

Fight against corruption. What succeeded, what failed, forecast.

Relations with the President and his administration, with the leaders and staff of the Government, the Federal Assembly.

How many years is it advisable for one person to work in the role of Minister of Internal Affairs in order to do a lot, but also not to sour (Dunaev - 3 months; Shchelokov - 16 years).

How would you respond today to critics of your work as a minister?

Erin and the media.

What is the biggest reward for what you have done in life? Why are you criticizing yourself?

How should the work on preparations for the 200th anniversary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs be carried out? What scientific works should be created for the anniversary?

Forecast of the development of Russia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

However, Viktor Fedorovich, at the mere reminder that not everything had been discussed, somehow immediately hurried, his face became stern, became even more significant and impenetrable. He did not answer these questions, except for brief comments on the events of October 1993 and the war in Chechnya, which will be cited. As an author, I, in general, understand him. He just didn't want to talk about something. In addition, he is the only one of the former ministers about whom this book is still in the big public service, and not retired. The time has probably not yet come to answer such questions. Therefore, my business and right is to ask, and his is to act according to the situation, including keeping silent. I am sincerely grateful to Viktor Fedorovich for his stories, without which an essay about him would be much more stingy.

What is missing, we will fill in documents, printed sources, stories of other persons.

Erin's name as Minister of Internal Affairs is associated with two of the most dramatic events in recent Russian history. First, it is the confrontation between the government forces and the opposition in September-October 1993 and their bloody outcome. Secondly, the war in Chechnya.

Note that August 1991 and October 1993, along with other characteristic features, are also remarkable in the following. In these events, the Ministers of Internal Affairs (past, current and future), perhaps for the first time in 200 years of the history of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. In August 1991: on the side of the opposition Pugo, as well as to some extent the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR Trushin, who by that time had become one of Pugo's deputies; on the other - Barannikov, Dunaev, Erin. A little over two years later - by October 1993 - the situation changed dramatically. Now Barannikov and Dunaev took the side of the opposition, and the government forces were represented by Erin and the future minister Kulikov. This was already an unprecedented affair in itself and testified to the depth of the social conflict: the ministers, called upon to protect the foundations of state power, went against each other as a wall. This means that these foundations themselves turned out to be completely blurred and were perceived by different people, even ministers, in different ways. In general, like Tvardovsky, although in a completely different situation: “What is there, where is Russia? Which line is your own? "

Erin's comment:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and I, as a minister, in the events of September - October 1993, took a sustained position. After the well-known Presidential Decree, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did everything necessary to ensure that public order was proper. No attempts to forcefully influence the opposition were made or planned.

But when those who considered themselves defenders of the White House began to smash our personnel, the television center in Ostankino, then the internal affairs bodies and internal troops began to take adequate measures against the offenders. My conscience is clear. I urged that, God forbid, blood should be shed. But many weapons were taken to the White House, although all sorts of people gathered.

One of your predecessors outlined your personal position in this situation approximately as follows: “In the events of 1993, as well as in others, Erin's psychology of the performer was clearly manifested. For obedience he also received a Hero of Russia ”.

I'm not a politician. I don't need political squabbles. If the object is under the protection of the state, then its protection coincides with my convictions. What else could you do? Give power to Makashov and Rutskoi? I've seen enough of them. No, I will not flee the ship at a difficult moment. We were not raised that way, including by the Communist Party.

This is how Erin summed up these events.

He, as the Minister of Internal Affairs, starting from September 22 to October 6, 1993, daily at 8 a.m. reported to the President in writing on the situation in the country over the past day, the reaction to Decree 1400 and the development of events in Moscow, where a state of emergency was declared.

Below is a fragmentary summary of the most salient points from these messages.

After the decisions of the Supreme Council to impose the duties of the President on Rutskoi, and the approval of Achalov, Barannikov and Dunaev as ministers, attempts were made to influence the internal affairs bodies. A telegram was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs-UVD, signed by Rutskoy and Khasbulatov, instructing, in particular, to suppress actions “that can be taken in connection with Yeltsin's unconstitutional Decree of September 21, 1993”. Dunaev called the duty department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and some central administrations, tried to give orders, including the distribution of Rutskoi's Decrees to the internal affairs bodies ... at night, 3300 police officers were involved. The situation in the country over the past day remained stable and was controlled by the local internal affairs bodies.

A stable and calm environment remains in the regions. In 27 cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg and others, rallies were held by supporters of the Supreme Soviet. About 20 thousand people took part in them. In the Yaroslavl region, 22 out of 27 small councils of city and regional councils recognized the President's Decree as inconsistent with the Constitution. At the same time, they did not support the decision on the appointment of ministers of power structures. Presidential Decree No. 1400 was approved by 40 percent of heads of administrations, 7 percent of Soviets. 17 percent of heads of administration and 50 percent of Soviets spoke negatively. The rest have not yet decided on their estimates. The tense situation remains in the area of ​​the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation. During the day, there were from 2 to 5 thousand citizens, to whom Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and others spoke.

The situation in the country has not changed significantly. Remaining calm and stable in the regions, it was distinguished by a certain activity of destabilizing forces in the capital. Supported the Presidential Decree of the Mordovian, Mari Republics, Kaliningrad and Nizhny Novgorod Regions. At the same time, 14 rallies and pickets of the Supreme Council supporters with a small number of participants (from 10 to 100 people) took place in 11 cities. Fulfilling the Decree of the President, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation took over 80 thousand of the most important objects under protection. To ensure order, 10-12 thousand police officers and 2-3 thousand servicemen of the internal troops are involved. On September 26, 1993, up to 4 thousand police officers will additionally arrive in Moscow and the region. Up to 3.5 thousand people gathered at the House of Soviets, which still remained the center of attraction of the opposition forces, during the day. For two hours a crowd of 500 people at the Barrikadnaya metro station held back the movement of a special police unit.

A calm atmosphere remained in the regions of the Russian Federation. Yakutia, Tambov, Magadan regions expressed their positive attitude to the Decree of the President. Disagreement with the ongoing reforms was expressed by the Soviets of the Novgorod region and the executive branch of the Republic of Adygea. Repeatedly supporters of the abolished Supreme Soviet made attempts to break through to the building of the House of Soviets through the cordon.

The atmosphere is calm. The demonstration activity of the population is decreasing. The Bryansk Regional Council regarded the Presidential Decree as an act of gross arbitrariness. Tensions remain around the House of Soviets. Among those gathered around him, a significant part are nonresident from the Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk, Nizhny Novgorod regions. According to operational data, there are 30 people in the building who arrived from Transnistria with firearms, as well as about 300 Kuban Cossacks with melee weapons (checkers and whips).

The number of participants in rallies and pickets in support of the former Supreme Soviet was insignificant, and only in Tambov - 2000 people. In Moscow, the actions of the opposition forces are beginning to acquire the character of an active confrontation. A ring of police squads has been formed around the building of the House of Soviets and the access control has been tightened.

The situation in the country is calm. At the same time, the artificial escalation of the situation around the White House building continues. The chairman of the Krasnopresnensky District Council of Moscow, Krasnov, announced his readiness to provide premises for the continuation of the work of the dissolved Congress of People's Deputies.

During the day, Barannikov, Dunaev, Achalov urged the police officers and servicemen of the internal troops, who were in the cordon, to become subordinate to the Supreme Soviet. However, there were no volunteers. Moreover, out of 1202 employees of the Security Department of the Supreme Council, 635 filed a report for transfer to service in the internal affairs bodies. Of these, 301 have already been appointed, 325 are being processed. Measures are also being taken to find jobs for the deputies of the Supreme Soviet who were in the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (20 people). Three of them have already been appointed to their respective positions.

At the building of the White House, 6.2 thousand people are involved, including police officers - 4 thousand, servicemen of the internal troops - 1.7 thousand, cadets more than 500 people.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on conferring the military rank of General of the Army to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation V.F. Erin.

On the whole, the situation in the regions remained calm. In Moscow, in the area of ​​Smolenskaya Square, during the day there were repeated clashes between the supporters of the Supreme Soviet (about 2 thousand people) with the forces of law and order. About 5 thousand people took part in the events to ensure public order at the White House.

On October 3, riots were provoked in Moscow by criminal elements incited from the White House. At 2.30 pm, a crowd of up to 10 thousand people gathered in the area of ​​Kaluzhskaya Square, proceeded along the Garden Ring, breaking through the barriers on the Crimean bridge, Zubovskaya and Smolenskaya squares, breaking through the cordon of police and internal troops near the House of Soviets. During the breakthrough, militants who left the White House used firearms. Specially formed armed groups pushed aside the police squads and seized five floors of the Moscow City Hall and the Mir hotel.

At 17 o'clock in the direction of Ostankino 15 cars and buses with armed persons moved. About 10 thousand people formed a column and headed towards the television center. At 19.30, the audience attacked the television center. Doorways were rammed by cars, grenade launchers were used. The attackers managed to get into the premises of the first floor, where they were stopped by the special forces of the internal troops and police officers, and then forced out of the building. During the attack, one of the buildings of the television center complex was set on fire. The fire was extinguished by the measures taken.

The buildings of ITAR-TASS, Krasnopresnenskiy Department of Internal Affairs, Timiryazevskiy telephone center were also attacked by detachments of armed militants, attempts were made to blockade the building of the Ministry of Defense. By the measures taken, the capture of these objects was not allowed, the attackers were scattered. While suppressing the riots, three servicemen of the internal troops and four police officers were killed, 46 were injured. According to preliminary data, 20 civilians were killed and 120 were wounded.

As of 6:00 am, the situation in the capital as a whole was taken under control. The tense situation continues at the House of Soviets, where about three thousand people continue to stay. The entrances to the building are blocked. Subdivisions of the internal troops have begun to carry out measures to disarm the militants in the White House area. The internal affairs bodies, together with the forces of the Russian army, the Ministry of Security and the Security Directorate, began to ensure the state of emergency. The city is divided into 10 commandant sections within the boundaries of the administrative districts.

Over the past day, 10 thousand police officers, 1000 cadets of educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2446 servicemen of the internal troops were involved in the protection of public order in Moscow. As the situation aggravated, a military reserve in the amount of 1,730 people and a reserve of employees of the central office - 500 people were put into operation.

In order to build up the forces of law and order in Moscow, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Internal Affairs Directorate of 53 regions of the Russian Federation were instructed to send OMON units to the capital. In held in g. Volgograd, Voronezh, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Lipetsk, Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Syktyvkar, Tula, Tyumen, Ulyanovsk, Cheboksary, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Rostov-on-Don, Kursk about 12 thousand human.

In pursuance of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 4 this year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the MB and the Ministry of Defense of Russia, created a joint operational headquarters for the leadership of military formations and other forces designed to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow.

In connection with the continuation of the fighting by the rebels, resulting in human casualties, at 7 o'clock. 50 minutes law enforcement and army units blocked the approaches to the White House, on which heavy guns were fired. At 8 o'clock. 30 minutes. the rebels were asked to surrender their weapons. In response, a small group disarmed.

The extremists continued to actively resist, using automatic weapons and sniper rifles from which they fired at police officers, military personnel, as well as civilians near the White House and the surrounding area.

Significant groups of supporters of the former Supreme Soviet made attempts to break through to the White House, but the forces of law and order were dispersed.

At 15 o'clock. 50 minutes the assault on the House of Soviets began. At 16 o'clock. 30 minutes. followed by an organized exit of the rebels who laid down their arms, as well as former deputies, employees of the apparatus of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and service personnel. By 17 o'clock. 30 minutes. their release became widespread. More than 1,500 people surrendered in total. They were taken to police units for investigation.

Among the detainees were the former head of the administration of the Bryansk region, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mordovia (deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Mordovia), five deputies of the Moscow Council, the head of the administration of the Selivanovsky district of the Vladimir region (deputy of the regional council), an employee of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense,

Law enforcement forces simultaneously worked off the premises of the White House in order to find and disarm the remaining armed criminals.

On the night of October 5, separate groups of rebels carried out armed attacks on the editorial offices of the newspapers Moskovsky Komsomolets and Moskovskaya Pravda, police station 43. Measures were taken to suppress criminal acts.

The organizers of the mutiny Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, Barannikov, Achalov, Dunaev, Makashov were detained. The centers of fires in the White House were liquidated. The formations of militants who managed to leave the cordon zone and go to the neighboring districts of the city were neutralized. Work continues on the detection of criminal groups and their disarmament.

In accordance with the order of the commandant of the state of emergency of Moscow, a special regime of entry and exit of their capital, as well as movement within certain areas of the territory, has been established. 46 checkpoints have been organized on the main highways, and vehicles are being screened.

In the city center, traffic is restricted along the streets leading to Krasnopresnenskaya embankment and to the House of Soviets. Particularly important objects of city power supply, transport, food industry, government bodies were taken under increased protection. Measures have been taken to suspend the functioning of shops and firms selling weapons and ammunition, and the issuance of permits for the acquisition and storage of weapons is prohibited.

When suppressing mass riots and armed resistance, 4 police officers and two servicemen were killed. 23 police officers and 14 servicemen of the internal troops were wounded.

According to additional information received, it was established that two police officers were killed in the White House area on October 3.

Over the past day, over 10 thousand police officers and 2.5 thousand internal troops were involved in the maintenance of public order in Moscow. As the situation worsened, a reserve was put into action. More than 3 thousand riot policemen who arrived from 47 republics, territories and regions of Russia were used.

In other regions, no serious excesses related to the measures taken to overcome the political crisis were noted.

A small number of citizens (2.5 thousand people) took part in the actions in support of the Supreme Council held in the cities of Saratov, Perm, Novosibirsk, Voronezh, St. Petersburg.

According to information received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 80.8 percent of the heads of the executive branch and 52.6 percent of the Soviets support the measures taken by the President of Russia to stabilize the situation in Moscow.

In addition to these official reports, the author has at his disposal working notes made by employees of the operational headquarters of the Main Directorate for Ensuring Public Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. In them, the events of October 3-4, 1993 are scheduled by the minute. These unsophisticated recordings significantly complement and clarify the overall picture. At first, due to the certain cumbersomeness of these data, it was decided not to include them in the book. But on reflection, I left it for history. An uninterested reader can safely omit them, and for those who wish, then an additional documentary unpublished source of important information. I express my gratitude to the former employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who gave me these records. We present them without corrections, in the form in which they were made, with all the abbreviations preserved.

Again from Erin's report to the President of the Russian Federation.

Of the 1,338 citizens detained in the building of the Supreme Council of citizens in the internal affairs bodies, 635 are still being held for identification. 148 people were killed, including 20 police officers, servicemen of the internal troops and the Ministry of Defense. In total, more than 17 thousand police officers, servicemen of the internal troops, as well as OMON detachments who arrived to provide assistance from other regions of Russia, using 40 armored personnel carriers and other special equipment, are involved in the protection of public order.

End of message.

There is an opinion that in a civil war, as a fratricidal war, those who distinguished themselves are not awarded. On this basis, the late General Rokhlin refused to be nominated for the title of Hero of Russia for the events in Afghanistan and Chechnya. However, the practice in October 1993 took a different path. Starting from October 6, 1993, Erin sent up not only reports on the situation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also submissions to the ranks of generals, the titles of Hero of Russia and the awarding of orders and medals.

Erin's petition to confer military and special ranks on the commanding staff of the internal troops and internal affairs bodies: Colonel-General - AS Kulikov; Colonel General of Militia to Deputy Ministers Egorov M.K., Kulikov A.N .; Lieutenant-General of Militia to the Chief of the Main Directorate for Organized Crime Control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation V.V. Ogorodnikov

On the same day, October 6, 1993, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation presented 10 servicemen of internal troops and employees of internal affairs bodies for the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for courage, heroism and selfless actions shown in the line of duty.

All those presented on October 7 were awarded such titles. In addition, such a document was later published.

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On conferring the title of Hero of the Russian Federation

General of the Army Erin V.F.

For courage and heroism shown in the suppression of an armed coup attempt on October 3-4, 1993 in the city of Moscow, to award the title of Hero of the Russian Federation to General of the Army Viktor Fedorovich Erin - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

President of Russian Federation

B. YELTSIN

Moscow Kremlin

On the same day, October 6, 1993, the Ministry of Internal Affairs nominated 14 people for the order “For personal courage” and the medal “For courage” - 4 people, 18 people in total.

On October 5 and 6, when examining the premises of the House of Soviets, the investigative and operational group found 488 units of firearms, including 185 submachine guns, 285 pistols, 5 grenade launchers, 13 rifles, 278 gas pistols, more than 36 thousand cartridges.

According to additional information, during the events at the House of Soviets, 143 people died, including 12 police officers, 5 servicemen of the internal troops and 5 from the Russian army.

Nominated for rewarding with the Order "For Personal Courage" 5 employees of the internal affairs bodies.

In the White House, operational and investigative teams seized 148 rifled firearms. Brigades of sappers found and removed 86 booby traps, 123 explosive devices, 1360 other explosive items, 52 boxes with cartridges for various types of weapons. Over 17 thousand people are involved in ensuring public order.

Representation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for rewarding 50 people, including the order "For personal courage" - 36 people, the medal "For excellent service in maintaining public order" - 14 people.

Another idea of ​​the awarding of 15 people, including the Order for Personal Courage - 5 people, the Medal for Excellent Service in the Protection of Public Order - 10 people.

Over the entire period of operation of the operational and investigative groups in the White House, 655 rifled firearms, 250 thousand ammunition of various types and calibers were found.

Submission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the rank of Hero of the Russian Federation, junior lieutenant of militia Korshunov S.I. (posthumously), awarding the Order For Personal Courage - 9, the Medal For Excellent Service for the Protection of Public Order - 25 people.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs presented for rewarding for courage and courage shown during the performance of a special assignment in conditions associated with a risk to life, 1,190 employees of the internal affairs bodies and servicemen of the internal troops, including the order "For personal courage" - 257, medals - 933 (" For courage "- 478," For excellent service in the maintenance of public order "- 455 people).

Ministry of Internal Affairs - to Yeltsin. For courage and courage in the performance of a special assignment, 2,161 employees of the internal affairs bodies were nominated for awarding orders and medals, including the Order For Personal Courage - 232, medals - 1929 (For Courage - 533, For Excellent Service in Protecting Public Order ”- 1396).

On the same day, 101 employees of the internal affairs bodies for courage and courage in extinguishing a fire were nominated for the order “For personal courage” - 9, medals - 92 people.

Thus, by the end of 1993, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation nominated about 3.5 thousand people for rewarding in connection with the events of September - October.

Such a massive presentation to high ranks, orders and medals has caused far from ambiguous assessments in society. Newspaper headlines at the time: “Awards instead of legal proceedings”; “Victory over whom?”; “Three Questions to the Hero-Minister”; “I'd like to know how the awards are found for such heroes (about awarding the Minister of Internal Affairs V. Erin)”; “Bloodshed in Moscow”; “The police let the detainees go and let their hands go,” and so on.

Here are some excerpts about the actions of the Interior Ministry forces.

From an interview with V. Erin to the newspaper "Argumenty i Fakty" in February 1994:

Correspondent: Readers will not understand me if I do not ask you about the events of October 3-4. How do you assess your performance at that moment?

Erin: My conscience is clear, because I did everything that I was supposed to do as Minister of Internal Affairs. The fact that we managed to solve this problem with the least human and political losses is, to a certain extent, not so much my merit as a minister, but the merit of the system itself. I do not want to offend journalists, because they wrote in hot pursuit. But paradoxical things turned out. Let's say there was a message stating that "a division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs went over to the side of the" White House "and what is the minister for the division that betrayed the President?" And I was ready to reward the commander of this unit. His company came under fire from the White House, he sees: one soldier is wounded, the other is killed. And a commander of any level must think about the least losses. He managed to take the unit to cover and ensure the safety of the people. It was clear to me after 10 minutes - they reported on the chain.

Correspondent: What were you there?

V. Erin: I regularly visited the chains, went there both at night and during the day.

Or, the journalists asked me: “Why did you watch the militants go to Ostankino, and did not stop them, didn’t shoot them?” Imagine just for a moment what it is like to start shooting at a bus on Prospekt Mira. Moreover, a bus with often innocent people.

Of course, I perfectly understand the flaw in the fact that tanks were firing at the White House. But talk to experts. The use of such shelling gave the least amount of losses and demoralized 2/3 of the personnel of the “BD” defenders, who did not receive any injuries or concussions, but simply could not stand it and went down to look for cover.

Another publication.

"PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MOSCOW

EVALUATES POLICE ACTIONS

DURING OCTOBER EVENTS

The Metropolitan Prosecutor's Office completed the verification of some of the statements of citizens about the illegal actions of the police in late September - early October this year. As of November 5, 18 cases of criminal abuse of power - beating of people, damage to personal property, and other criminal actions of the police - were identified. Criminal cases have been initiated. Another 37 signals of abuse of power by law enforcement officers are being checked.

After checking numerous signals, the prosecutor's office states: despite the great and difficult work done in extraordinary conditions, nevertheless, often in cases requiring immediate intervention, the use of force and the law in the suppression of offenses, the employees of the internal affairs bodies clearly evaded the operational performance of their duties. And, on the contrary, they abused their official powers in relation to law-abiding citizens, limited the individual freedoms guaranteed by law, humiliated the honor and dignity of people, and used violence against them.

In the last days of September, according to the prosecutor's office, large groups of people who were not at all involved in the organization and participation in illegal actions were brought to the police unnecessarily. On September 28-30 alone, about 250 people were illegally detained in subdivisions of the 2nd police department of the Central Administrative District (the territory where the House of Soviets is located). Meanwhile, from September 21 to October 1, not a single crime against the order of government, public safety, and human health was revealed in this territory. In total, weapons and ammunition were confiscated from four citizens (2 knives, nunchucks, grenade fuses). Only after the instruction of the prosecutor's office was a case initiated on the fact of the threat of violence against the official.

In violation of the Presidential Decree “On the procedure for organizing and holding rallies, street marches, demonstrations and picketing,” the police did not warn, stop and document the illegal actions of those guilty of a group action unauthorized by the city authorities that took place on October 2 on Smolenskaya Square. As you know, it escalated into riots.

On October 3, despite the powerful concentration of forces of the internal affairs bodies, Kaluzhskaya Square and the Garden Ring were not properly guarded, no measures were taken to detain violators of public order, to seize weapons that were in the possession of some participants in the rally and march, to blockade and detain illegal armed formations that openly declared their criminal intentions and began to implement them, which led to a loss of control over events, human casualties.

At the same time, the Moscow prosecutor's office notes, in circumstances where there was no legal basis for the use of coercive measures, employees of the internal affairs bodies committed numerous violations of the law against citizens, people's deputies, journalists, and law enforcement officials. In particular, criminal cases were initiated at the request of P.I. Kameiko, who was forced into a bus by the police at the Barrikadnaya metro station on September 30, beaten, searched and stolen 30 thousand rubles; on the death of N.I. Chelyakov, who died of beatings received on October 3 in a police cordon near the Ulitsa 1905 Goda metro station; on the occasion of malicious obstruction of the activities of journalists A.A. Tsyganov (“Ogonyok”) and A.I. Kakotkin (“Moskovskie Novosti”), who testified that on October 4 on Rochdelskaya Street they were beaten by policemen while performing their professional duties. Another 37 signals of abuse of power are being checked.

On a large scale, citizens were arbitrarily detained and taken to temporary detention centers, pre-trial detention centers. In the period from 3 to 5 October, more than 6 thousand people were detained in them, while protocols on administrative offenses were drawn up in relation to only half of the detainees. On October 4, 59 people were in the detention facilities of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate, all of them were released due to the absolute absence of legal grounds for bringing to any responsibility. On the same days, 348 citizens were placed in pre-trial detention centers in the city, including 8 journalists, 3 deputies, several police officers and an investigator among them - all without documents justifying the detention or orders for detention.

In violation of Article 21 of the Law "On the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation", the access of prosecutors to the Main Internal Affairs Directorate, where the detainees were kept, was illegally restricted, which, in fact, was an opposition to the supervisory activities of the prosecutor's office.

The Moscow prosecutor's office came to the conclusion that the passivity of the internal affairs bodies in the initial period of exacerbation of the situation in the city, their failure to use legal means of preventing, combating violators of administrative and criminal laws were one of the reasons due to which the centers of growing conflicts and mass riots. Subsequently, individual actions of the police began to bear the character of lawlessness and arbitrariness.

As the Moscow Prosecutor Gennady Ponomarev told Izvestia, his department has repeatedly pointed out to the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the capital and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation on the abuse of power by the police officers, on the one hand, and their failure to fulfill their direct duties, on the other. The corresponding submissions were sent to the leadership of the Moscow police and Minister V. Erin. There was no reaction.

G. Ponomarev is pessimistic about the chances of bringing the initiated criminal cases to court. And he believes that the official appeal of the capital's prosecutor's office to the Prosecutor General's Office and to the mayor of Moscow is unlikely to be crowned with adequate measures against the perpetrators. "

Alexander Protsenko. I'd like to know how the awards find such heroes. (Megapolis Express, 1993, No. 41, October 20).

“Last week, Russian President Boris Yeltsin publicly presented the newly-baked general of the army (he became him on October 1 of this year), Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, with the highest distinction of the country - Hero of the Russian Federation.

... On the night of October 3–4, when Yegor Gaidar was forced to turn to unarmed Muscovites for help, I myself walked around and toured half the city and saw that the police had abandoned Moscow to its fate. But then, the next day, when it became clear "whose take", Moscow was again flooded with police ...

By the way, while preparing this material, I tried to get somewhere the text of the decree on conferring this title on Viktor Yerin. And ... I did not find it. It was not published in newspapers, it was not in the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the apparatus of the President of Russia, in the department of awards, they could not find such a decree ”.

“… A terrible tragedy happened, and awards are being given to officials, generals… That night I was ashamed that I was a member of the government, which could not protect its people, that our law enforcement agencies sat and waited for whose will take. After all, Gaidar had to speak on TV and call people to the square to the Moscow City Council because there was no hope for the law enforcement agencies. Erin was not in control of the situation. The army bided its time. I don't know what MB was doing

“… Muscovites, Russians and the whole world have not yet recovered from the shock… and the ministers, and thus the all-powerful security forces, have already been ceremoniously presented with the highest awards of Russia. For personal courage.

And I thought there was an official trial - all three ...

But still I want to figure it out: why, for example, Viktor Erin is now both a Hero and a general of the army, and the other two security forces are also heroes, but smaller, they were awarded - also for personal courage - the second most important award ... just the Minister of Defense has there is one gold star and two for a young minister in peacetime, too much; and the other minister - security, in this position recently. "

Vladimir Gusarov. "Golden Company". Capital, 1993.

“Let's give the floor to the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, without naming names at their request.

Around September 28, our cordon sector received an order: "Conduct exercises to move the reserve." What started here! How our teams went on the air, how this reserve began to move back and forth - and we are all in helmets, bulletproof vests, with machine guns - a bunch of people jumped out of parliament with machine guns at the ready - Cossacks, Barkashovites, military. And they lay down, taking up the defense. And Rutskoi, Dunaev and Barannikov are already rushing to us: "What are you doing!" We explain to them: teachings. They calmed down a little and began to lure away - they promised money, titles, awards. And Rutskoi went to the sergeants-guards: “Come on, guys, to us - you will be officers. Anyway, we will shoot everyone above the captain! ” (words of the police officer) ...

... Let's move on to the official assessment. According to General Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs - V.N.), the management of the Interior Ministry units was not lost for a single second. The commander of the internal troops also rejected the assertion that the assistance to Ostankino was late ... But the police officers involved in blocking the database (the White House - V.N.) unanimously affirm: from 15:00 on October 3 to 14:00 on October 4, the leadership the internal affairs bodies from the GUVD were completely absent.

-… There was complete chaos - the GUVD did not get in touch, the ministry was gone, all the information was received only on TV. Only at 20.00 Pankratov (head of the GUVD) held a conference call - he said one phrase: “Continue the usual service for maintaining public order ...” And that's it, he disappeared again. There is a mutiny in the city, but here

At first, the command betrayed us and abandoned us, waiting to take the side of the winner. And then suddenly appeared in a halo of gold stars on the chest and shoulder straps. Rewards in batches began to be received by those who were not even close there, under the bullets. I arrived after the events at the GUVD - they were sitting, staff rats, they were printing award sheets. I said to them: "Come on, bring my guys there!" - “It’s not allowed, we have an order…” (municipal police officer) ”.

These are some of the publications.

All this was perceived especially sharply against the background of the death of a significant number of people in the October 1993 events. There are many discrepancies in the existing data on this issue. Official sources indicate that 152 people died, including 26 police officers, servicemen of the internal troops and the Ministry of Defense. In the book “Moscow. Autumn - 93. Chronicle of confrontation ”, the names of 147 victims are given, that is, 5 people less.

However, another version is also widely circulated: a hundred times more people died, but the authorities are hiding it, and the corpses were secretly taken out. So, in Khasbulatov's book “The Great Russian Tragedy” (M., in two volumes, 1994) we read: “They killed more than 1,500 people in the September-October coup d'état, deceived the country in the most insolent way, deceived the whole world, committed perjury , they shot Parliament in the middle of a huge city, ordered to beat tens of thousands of people. On their orders, they committed cruel violence against women and even against underage girls. With their blessing, parliamentary property belonging to the people was stolen for 51 trillion rubles ... The tank unit was breaking through to help the besieged city - where are the surviving soldiers of this unit? For what purposes were there “radio games” at the Parliamentary Palace day and night on these tragic days - with the aim of disorienting the military units coming to the aid of the Parliament? - who wanted to preserve the honor and dignity of the army? ... Who will answer these questions? - There will be someone to answer ... "

Elsewhere in the same book under the title “Nuremberg - 2. Crimes against humanity. One and a half thousand corpses ”, the following message of“ Nezavisimaya Gazeta ”for October 30, 1993 is quoted: ...“ I am an officer of the internal troops and it is a question of honor for me to report everything that I know ... In total, 1,500 corpses were found in the White House, among them women and children. All of them were secretly taken out from there through an underground tunnel leading from the White House to the Krasnopresnenskaya metro station and further out of the city, where they were burned ... cumulative projectiles; the shockwave generated when they burst in the building was so strong that the heads of the victims burst. The walls were spattered with their brains. This is much worse than fascism, gentlemen! This is monstrous, and you cannot express it in words! ”.

“… The most fierce cruelty came from the police units, Omsk and Leningrad OMON. There has not yet been an “Ostankino” shooting, and 23 demonstrators have already been beaten to death with truncheons, rods, pipes near the Barrikadnaya metro station and Smolenskaya Square, and the Moscow Prosecutor Ponkratov, with Stepankov’s sanction, immediately opened a criminal case against the head of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate.

Yeltsin overturned this decision, relieving Stepankov of the post of Prosecutor General. On Erin's instructions, the police cordons (OMON, special forces) did not allow a convoy of cars (20 trucks) of the International Red Cross with humanitarian food and medicine to reach the House of Soviets. The foreigners accompanying the transport were severely beaten, and their property was plundered. For 14 days, not a single ambulance was allowed to the building by the police, not a single patient in need (heart disease, hypertensive patient) was taken out of the area ringed with barbed wire.

There is an international practice to disperse a crowd of demonstrators using water cannons. And this is already considered almost legal and natural. But only in an inflamed brain ... an “idea” could be born to fill the water cannons with boiling water.

On the 4th, early in the morning, the assault on the House of Soviets began with machine-gun fire on the defenders sitting around the bonfires, armored personnel carriers with hired thugs in civilian clothes, who called themselves "Afghans." These armored personnel carriers with a full combat kit were allocated to the “Afghans” from the OMSDON division.

According to the plan of the assault on the House of Soviets, the northern sector (entrances No. 8, No. 20) were given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There, in these entrances, from the 1st to the 3rd floors, riot policemen, who were mad with vodka and blood, carried out reprisals against the defenders of the Parliament: they cut, finished off the wounded, and raped. Everyone who tried to break out of the building through 8, 20 entrances in the direction of the stadium was subjected to inhuman beatings, bullying, and for some it all ended in execution at the stadium.

In the plan to storm the House of Soviets, it was envisaged at the very last moment to launch into the building for cleaning (massacre) with knives, brass knuckles, chains, strangleholds detachments of the Beitar youth organization, the Most-Bank security service of Gusinsky and other firms. These 3-4 combat detachments of 500-700 people each were concentrated on 3 sides of the House of Soviets building at a distance of 30-50 meters from the City Hall, the Mir Hotel, and the Gorbaty Bridge. They were waiting for a signal to act, but were not introduced, the Alpha unit opposed this, realizing that this was the method of “long knives”. If these criminal forces were involved together with the police, it would go down in history and in all textbooks on jurisprudence of the world, as the most idiotic practice of merging state law enforcement agencies with criminal mercenaries.

The order was given to his general Golubets - deputy. Chief of the Internal Troops, Lieutenant Colonel Lysyuk - the commander of "Vityaz", units storming the House of Soviets, use weapons without warning and to defeat unarmed demonstrators. A photocopy of the order is available. The events of those days were recorded on videotape and partially shown in documentary newsreels, in S. Govorukhin's film "The Hour of Scoundrels" on central television ...

... The shameful mission ... was carried out by subdivisions of the internal troops of the Moscow District under the command of General Baskaev, appointed commandant of the House of Soviets on the night of October 4-5, 1993. Having cordoned off the building, firemen were not allowed there to extinguish the fire, doctors to help the wounded. This unit, eliminating the traces of the authorities' crime, removed and destroyed about 1,500 corpses of the defenders of the House of Soviets ”.

These are publications, messages, versions.

True, there is no documentary confirmation of all these versions about such a large number of victims. But if this is really so, then the data will surely emerge in the future.

The October events of 1993 were also assessed by the State Duma commission on impeachment - the removal from power of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin. In the materials of the commission, published in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya in September - October 1998, such accusations were voiced.

On the second day, after the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1400, the blockade of the building of the Supreme Soviet began. The deputies were not allowed to work, the House of Soviets was cordoned off by the police, blocked by trucks, fenced off with barbed wire, the use of which is prohibited by international conventions. Speeches of citizens who took to the streets of Moscow in support of the legally elected government and the Constitution were brutally suppressed.

By the mere issuance of this Decree, the commission believes, Yeltsin committed a grave crime under Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Conspiracy to seize power”. Decree No. 1400 turned Russia from a parliamentary republic into a presidential one, that is, it changed the state structure of the country. In this conspiracy, the commission notes, along with Yeltsin, the leaders of the government, some ministries and departments, and primarily the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (Minister Erin), who unquestioningly carried out the president's orders, took part. The commission was presented with documents on awarding the "especially distinguished" in the events of September - October 1993.

On the morning of October 4, troops surrounded the House of Soviets. An order was given for the use of all types of small arms, as well as tank guns against the people's deputies and citizens gathered at the House of Soviets. As a result, according to the General Prosecutor's Office, 148 people died. According to unofficial data, the number of those killed is estimated at 1,500.

As follows from the reports of the prosecutor's office, not a single person was killed from the weapons that the guards of the House of Soviets had. Actions to shoot Russian citizens are qualified as a crime provided for in paragraphs "d", "e", "h" of Article 102 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in force at that time. The listed crimes belong to the category of grave crimes, and the resolution of the State Duma "On amnesty ..." does not apply to them. The "Bruno" spiral, explosive bullets, "bird cherry" were used against the defenders of the House of Soviets.

From the testimony of the Commission of the main witness for the prosecution of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation R. Khasbulatov: “The storming of the House of Soviets in itself is an absolutely ridiculous idea. Why so many military equipment, so many riot police armed to the teeth? At dawn, on October 4, when they were expecting a peaceful denouement, the rumble of tanks was heard. The first to fire were large-caliber machine guns, then armored personnel carriers, and then tanks. A terrible sight. By this time, there were about 4 - 4.5 thousand people in the building. The first victims appeared. There was one heartbreaking episode: a woman with a white handkerchief approached the broken window to warn that there were women and children in this wing of the building ... She was directly torn apart by a burst from a large-caliber machine gun ...

It is important to add: no message or ultimatum that there would be an assault was not transmitted to us. Power structures at that moment stood up to protect Yeltsin's private interests ”.

The following document was also presented to the Parliamentary Commission: “To His Excellency the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. B.N. Yeltsin. Dear Mr. President, the government of the Chechen Republic approves of your actions to suppress the communist fascist rebellion in Moscow, which aimed to seize power in Russia, drown democracy in blood, and revive a historically obsolete system in the country. Reactions trying to take revenge have suffered a serious blow, but the possibility of new sorties is not excluded. Therefore, we wish you and your supporters decisiveness and steadfastness in consolidating the achieved success, consistency in the implementation of the course of democratic reforms.

President of the Chechen Republic D. Dudaev.

Here is such a complicated picture around the October 1993 events in Moscow and the participation of Interior Minister Erin in them.

Now the second hot problem is Chechnya. In a conversation with the author, Viktor Fedorovich said only a few words about it, literally the following: “Political decisions have been made in Chechnya. The main stress fell on the Armed Forces. Where the Ministry of Internal Affairs could do something, it did. We created conditions for the restoration of the national economic complex. ”

I think that in the lapidarity of these assessments one can see the ex-minister's unrelenting feelings about those bitter events. The author also does not aim to give a complete picture of the actions of the Interior Ministry forces in the Chechen war and their leadership by Minister Erin. I believe that the time has not yet come for final and deep assessments. The tragedy of Chechnya continues, only in other forms. The political and economic crisis has not been overcome here. The documents on the military actions of the Interior Ministry forces have not yet been deposited for archival storage and there is essentially no access to them. Published books about the participation in the Chechen war of internal troops and internal affairs agencies are valuable sources (Chechen crisis: a test for statehood; Criminal regime. Chechnya, 1991 - 195; Budennovsk: seven days of hell. M., 1995; B. Karpov, O. Smirnov. Internal troops: Caucasian cross. M., 1997 and some others). But all of them were written in hot pursuit and provide only the first cut of this complex multidimensional problem. We will limit ourselves to just a few reflections.

First of all, about the organization of hostilities in Chechnya and the identification of the main executors. On December 17, 1994, a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was held under the leadership of President Yeltsin, at which the issue was considered: "On the progress of measures to restore constitutional legality, law and order and peace in the Chechen Republic." The Council decided from 00:00 on December 18, 1994 to start implementing measures to disarm and destroy illegal armed groups.

The Council obliged the Russian Ministry of Defense (Grachev), the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Erin), the Federal Grid Company of Russia (Stepashin) and the Federal Border Guard Service - the Civil Code of the Russian Border Troops (Nikolaev) to attract all the necessary forces and means to guarantee the fulfillment of tasks for the disarmament and destruction of illegal armed formations in the Chechen Republic of a reliable closure state and administrative boundaries. Thus began the Chechen war and the participation of the Interior Ministry forces in it.

By this decision of the Security Council, Defense Minister Grachev was given the authority to coordinate the activities of all security forces. His decisions, orders and orders within the framework of these powers were binding on strict execution.

Subsequently, the role of the coordinator of all actions in Chechnya shifted towards the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which did not bring laurels to either the ministry or the then minister Yerin, and later to Kulikov.

By the decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation of January 6, 1995, the functions of disarming illegal armed formations were transferred to the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. It was determined that now the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in cooperation with units and subdivisions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, is taking measures to disarm illegal armed formations. As the main executor in the implementation of the task, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia coordinates the actions of the involved forces of the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Border Guard Service, and the Russian Emergencies Ministry. For this purpose, federal troops deployed on the territory of the Chechen Republic were transferred to the operational subordination of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In form, everything seems to be logical and understandable. However, when conceived as an easy campaign began to develop into a large-scale war that had lasted for years, it became hard for everyone. First of all, let us note that the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs acted there in a completely unusual way. Bodies and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, their special units have a certain experience of participation in the protection of public order and the fight against crime, including in extreme conditions. However, for large-scale hostilities with the use of aviation, heavy armored vehicles, modern electronic means of warfare, the internal troops and even more so the internal affairs bodies, including riot police, SOBR and other special formations, have never been prepared, they have no experience, their organizational and staff structure for this not adapted. Therefore, the insufficient effectiveness of the actions of these forces was to a certain extent predetermined in advance. And even more so, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was not ready for the role of the coordinator of hostilities. Probably, not in any other country in the world the Ministry of Internal Affairs has never played such an unusual role.

In fact, there was a substitution of one concept for another. They said that since in Chechnya it was about the disarmament of illegal armed (we read - bandit) formations, then the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they say, had already got its hand in such cases, it was up to him to be in charge. In fact, they did not catch lone bandits or united in small groups there, but fought a well-trained Chechen army and mercenaries from all over the world. In such a situation, I think, the role of the dominant force for the Ministry of Internal Affairs was not only unusual, but also beyond its capacity.

The very beginning of the war in December 1994 was nothing more than political myopia and adventurism. At first, “great generals” like Grachev devoted only a few hours or days to everything about everything in Chechnya, but they got what they deserved from the Chechens for such lightness. Then they began to throw into the fiery hell everything that was possible and that was not allowed - untrained young soldiers, subdivisions and units of internal troops, militiamen.

Soldiers, sergeants, rank-and-file officers of the internal affairs bodies, warrant officers, officers and generals of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Federal Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations in their overwhelming majority behaved like soldiers heroically, often died. But what's the use of this? A man with a gun often did not understand why he was here, why he was shooting himself, why his comrades were being killed. As a result, mountains of corpses. How many of them were in fact is still unknown.

Grief. Tears of mothers and loved ones. It is a deep disappointment that as a result of the fratricidal war the land has been devastated, the destinies of thousands of people have been mutilated, but not a single problem has been resolved. And like a sweetened pill - again bitter rewards, an attribute of every war, righteous and unrighteous. This is the sad result, although it is difficult to say that this is the last round of the power struggle in the North Caucasus. There are plenty of acute problems and combustible material. And now again, much depends on the art of politicians, the maturity of the minds of statesmen.

Let us turn again to the materials of the State Duma impeachment commission, which also considered the third point of accusations - the Chechen company and the illegal actions of Russian President Yeltsin during this period.

It was noted at the meeting that in Russia everything related to the role of the president in the Chechen conflict is surrounded by secrecy, in particular the following questions: Where did the militants get the most modern technology? Who gave orders to the federal troops to retreat when illegal bandit formations were on the brink of defeat? How did Basayev's group manage, bypassing all checkpoints and the traffic police, to drive freely to Budennovsk, and Raduev to Kizlyar? Did Lebed have the right to sign any agreements on behalf of Russia? Why are Russian prisoners of war staying in Chechnya? Who will answer these questions, if the exact number of those killed is not even known, if the bodies of many are still not buried, if the perpetrators of the tragedy are not only not brought to justice, but also continue to maintain high positions in the power structures of both Chechnya and Russia?

It was indicated that the topic of a serious investigation is the fact of the possible transfer in 1992 to Chechnya of 50 percent of the weapons of Russian units stationed in the republic, by order of Marshal Shaposhnikov and with the direct participation of Defense Minister Grachev. In particular, 150 training aircraft, 150 thousand grenades, 40 thousand small arms, multiple launch rocket systems "Grad", rocket launchers "Luna - 8". Other countries also supplied weapons to Dudayev. It is believed that the accumulated weapons would be enough for seven well-equipped divisions.

At the commission, the mediocre command of the federal troops was regarded as a crime.

According to A.N. Mityukhin, Colonel-General, the former commander of the North Caucasian Military District, who until December 21, 1994 was the commander of the federal forces in Chechnya, “On the day of the entry of the troops, it was impossible to find anyone. There is no president, the government does not answer ... One or another company can be carried out with large-scale hostilities with great destruction, or with the help of special operations: this usually allows people to be saved. For some reason, the command in Chechnya chose the first option. The general leadership of the hostilities was headed by P. Grachev ... After the start of the assault on Grozny, all the bridges were burned. We have been firmly dragged into the war. ”

The commission also stated that the Russian “dempress”, breast-feeding the Chechen militants, human rights activists such as S. Kovalev, who took up arms against Russian soldiers, did not say a word about the situation of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya before the outbreak of hostilities, where by that time 1 million lived. people, of which 30 percent are Russians. Even before the military operations, 350 thousand people were expelled from Chechnya by the Dudayev regime and 45 thousand people were killed. Later, 140 thousand people left the republic. The Kremlin tried not to react to the blatant genocide of Russians.

So the brevity of Yerin's comments on the events in Chechnya is understandable. One can only sympathize with him. Moreover, the resignation of Viktor Fedorovich from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs took place after the terrible bloody events in Budennovsk. In this regard, I will tell you about one unexpected find.

The surname of V.F. Erin, like other Russian leaders, the author accidentally met in such a fundamental publication as The Chronicle of Humanity (1996), where the most important events on earth from ancient times to January 1996 are recorded.

In 1995, foreign authors of the book referred to the seizure of the city of Budennovsk by the terrorists of Basayev and the helplessness of the power structures of Russia, which were unable to forestall such a negative development of events, among the world-famous events. In this regard, as noted by the Chronicle of Humanity, by the Decree of the President of Russia, a number of officials were removed from their duties, including the Minister of Internal Affairs Erin. Thus, this Russian disgrace is classified as a global phenomenon, singled out as one of the eight most significant events in the world in 1995. In general, records, but not the same.

The roots of the Chechen tragedy, its main sources, should be sought in the imperfection of the political leadership. The President and other federal bodies, in their constantly incessant struggle for power, completely missed control over the situation in this region at the turn of the 90s. When they realized it, it was no longer possible to restore even elementary order there by the usual methods. A shallow assessment of the current situation by the federal authorities, another adventurous attempt to bring the freedom-loving people to their knees by force of arms were doomed to failure by history itself.

All this was already in the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, in unsuccessful attempts to suppress political banditry in the North Caucasus in the Soviet years, up to the expulsion of indigenous peoples from their historical places of residence. Likewise, the 1994-1996 Chechen war was doomed to failure from the very beginning. She once again confirmed that there is simply no military solution to the Chechen problem. This is evidenced by two centuries of experience.

Erin's activities as the Minister of Internal Affairs were sufficiently covered in the media. Sometimes even and objective, but more often with an overlap. Journalists, especially in the troubled days of October 1993, during the Chechen war, gave headlines of newspaper articles boldly, sweepingly, as if they tried to outdo each other. Television also got it.

During the days of hostilities in Chechnya, when the soldier was already having a hard time, many TV programs, especially on NTV, scorched this soldier as best they could. The impression was that for some journalists the worse the better. Sober up only later, two years later or later. And Erina, later A.S. Kulikov was constantly demanded to be dismissed, as if this decided the essence of the matter.

And the NTV program “Dolls” practiced as best it could. Erin's double appeared before the audience as a kind of swanky balabol who sometimes talked about the case, and more often not about the case. Outwardly, the Erin doll was very similar to the doll of another TV hero of the 70s screen, who constantly sang a song about it: “Don't open your mouth, read the newspaper. Come on - come on - let's re-educate me! ” The TV people glued him to the sticky "yo-mine", which later migrated by inheritance to the new minister - A.S. Kulikov. Even the voice-over was left the same. It was a pity to lose the colorful find. As the people say, you can't put a scarf on every mouth.

Of the book publications about Erin, in addition to those already mentioned, we note the following. A lot of benevolent pages are dedicated to him in the book of Boris Yeltsin “Notes of the President” (Moscow, 1994).

“Victor Erin. I was sure of him. I am confident as in myself. I knew that for him, as the head of one of the power ministries, the situation of diarchy was becoming unbearable. The police were harassed; The Soviets, especially where they were strong, tried to take control of it.

I saw Viktor Fedorovich in different situations. And in joyful moments, for example, when he showed me the successes of his fighters during the exercises. And in difficult times, when at the Security Council, on the initiative of Skokov and Rutskoi, with the active support of Barannikov, the question of Erin's resignation arose. Then I sharply spoke out against the removal of the minister. He only worked for four months, and not only Erin was to blame for the increase in crime. To blame everything on one minister was at least unfair. Then Yerin received a severe reprimand. Later, when I managed to get to know him better, I discovered a deep, intelligent, very conscientious person. I’m not talking about how he is respected in the police, and I’m not talking about his professional qualities. He is a wonderful man ... "

Yeltsin cares about Erin's authority. In one of the archives I found such an interesting sketch. At a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Sergei Berlusconi at Staro-Ogarevo on October 13, 1994, in response to his invitation to take part in a world conference in Italy on combating international crime, Yeltsin agreed to send a Russian delegation headed by Yerin. He emphasized that it is desirable to give him the opportunity to speak at the conference.

S. Berlusconi's answer: “I promise that the most honorable place will be assigned to the Russian minister: I will sit him on my right hand. Of course, he will be given the opportunity to speak. "

Tells the lieutenant general, a former employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MB. He is critical of Yerin, but objectively characterizes him as follows: “Yerin, first of all, is a professional in police affairs. Secondly, he is an analyst leader. From the analysis, he draws correct and deep conclusions. His head is light, arranged according to the state, with a wide range. The document grasps quickly.

He, however, does not always look outwardly, not a very big speaker. This is probably why, when Barannikov three times tried to introduce Erin into the presidential circle, Yeltsin at first did not accept him. Then the President changed his attitude towards Erin ”.

Another interlocutor, also a retired militia lieutenant general, says the opposite: “Yerin was weak as a militiaman. For this, he is not a competent person. His range of thinking was much less than the assigned area of ​​work. He is the head of the department of the ministry, and nothing more. To become a minister from a department head is not the case ”.

In A. Korzhakov's book: “Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk” (Moscow, 1997) we find such assessments. On October 1993 events:

“Viktor Fedorovich Erin behaved with dignity in a difficult situation. Without any pressure from “above” he sent police officers to defend the television center in Ostankino. We came to his ministry late in the evening on purpose with Barsukov to support him, to show that we were ready to share the responsibility. We looked into each other's eyes and without a word understood: everything is fine. We are there, in the Kremlin, and he is here, but we will hold out together and together. Erin's gaze was absolutely calm and firm, I did not notice any hesitation in his eyes sore from fatigue. "

Elsewhere in the same book we read: “Instead of Barannikov, an apartment was given to Viktor Yerin, then he was the Minister of Internal Affairs. I am still not disappointed in him - he is a very decent person ”.

“To the endless demands of the deputies for his resignation from O. Poptsov about Erin in the Chronicle of the Times of Tsar Boris. (M., 1996):

position was philosophical: "As long as the President needs me, I will work." In police circles, he is considered a high professional. During the October events of 1993, with the participation of the army, he managed to maintain public order in Moscow.

He is trying to reorganize the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He understands that the police, afflicted with the same disease, cannot fight corruption. Enjoys the confidence of the President. Finding himself in critical situations in tandem with the Minister of Defense, he gives up leadership to him. As a result, purely police operations are carried out by the regular army. It is she who bears human losses, the anger of public opinion falls on her. It happened in October 1993, it happened again in Chechnya. After the October events, together with Pavel Grachev, he was awarded the Golden Star of the Hero of Russia.

Average growth. A lean figure. Appearance is not ministerial. The face retains an offended expression. Speech is professionally simplified. In relationships with colleagues, he is grumpy. The voice is not loud, not bossy. Works with heavy loads, which is why it looks like a sleepy person.

Stubborn character.

After the dramatic events in Budennovsk, he resigned from the post of head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The President accepted the resignation, but he appreciated Erin's loyalty, keeping him in the leadership team as the first deputy head of foreign intelligence. "

And here is what V. Kostikov writes in the book "Romance with the President" (Moscow, 1997) about the President's reaction to the decision of the State Duma on amnesty on February 23, 1994: not to smear the situation, but to "immediately arrest those released under the amnesty." The President was very determined. He pressed a button on the remote control and immediately began talking to V.F. Yerin: “We need to make arrests immediately. You know who, ”he said, without giving any names.

We heard all of Viktor Fyodorovich's answers, because the president did not consider it necessary to hide the conversation from us and he had an audio intercom. Erin replied that he was ready to carry out the order, but that he needed the official consent of the new Prosecutor General Ilyushenko.

There will be consent, - the president said briefly and disconnected the connection ...

... I have no information about what happened after the President left the Kremlin. We waited all day for evidence that Yeltsin's order would be carried out. But time passed, and there was no news. Late in the evening from my dacha, I called my friends at Interfax and, without disclosing the reasons for my interest, asked if they had any news. There was no expected news. They were not there in the morning. Some kind of braking mechanisms worked, and Yeltsin's order was either blocked or withdrawn.

... Perhaps the president decided to make concessions on the amnesty issue in exchange for a reciprocal step by the State Duma. And such a step was taken. On February 23, 1994, Rybkin signed a Resolution of the State Duma on the liquidation of the commission to investigate the events of September 21 - October 4, 1993. "

In R. Khasbulatov's two-volume book “The Great Russian Tragedy” (Moscow, 1994), the author did not regret paints for Erin. We read: "... the Yeltsin-Erinites ..., the Yeltsin-Erin rebels ..."

… “But the army was still considered not the main object of training the putschists - they well remembered the lessons of August 1991.

The main thing is the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, there is an intensive expansion of capabilities to carry out almost military operations by the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Creation of large, not only combat-ready, but also well-armed internal troops, including light and heavy infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, amphibious equipment, artillery, including the strengthening of OMON, OMSDON, etc.

Special units that were previously part of the structure of the security agencies are transferred here, their teams receive numerous benefits. And Erin, a completely grayish person, is quickly becoming an influential person in the Kremlin. "

And further: “At this meeting of the Supreme Soviet (May 1993), Viktor Erin was removed from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs - in full accordance with the Constitution. However, Yeltsin refused to comply with the Parliamentary Resolution. Without relieving this discredited man from his post, he continued to stir up the situation.

Therefore, Erin's participation in the conspiracy against the Constitution and the cruelty shown by the special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Yeltsin putsch on September 21 - October 4, 1993 are also understandable. "

From the book by N. Gulbinsky and M. Shakina "Afghanistan ... the Kremlin ... Lefortovo ...?" “Erin gave the command - not to take witnesses ... They will not leave us alive ... Chernomyrdin is lying, Erin is lying! I beg you, Valera, well, you understand, you are a believer (mat), you will be sinned! ... Call foreign embassies, let foreign ambassadors come here. "

About the Armenian period of Erin's activity, there is, for example, A. Gurov's testimony from the book “The Red Mafia” (M., 1995): “Once, literally within a few days in Armenia, forty attacks were made on regional police departments with the aim of seizing weapons. The weapons, of course, were seized without a fight, and when he was the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Armenia, the current Hero of Russia V. Erin, ".

Years have passed since Erin's appointment to foreign intelligence. Once on vacation in November 1997, we met with one of the generals of this service. I ask him how Erin got accustomed to them, how he was accepted, how his new job is going.

At first, - says my interlocutor, - they took it with caution, which is not surprising. After all, Erin came from the outside. In addition, he has the highest military rank in foreign intelligence: even then the director was only a colonel-general, and Erin was an army general. However, gradually everything fell into place. Viktor Fyodorovich is undoubtedly an intelligent person. His behavior adequately reflects the prevailing situation. And although we work with him in different areas of our service, I know that everything is going well with him and around him.

Later, when I met Yerin himself in July 1998, I asked him how he was working in the new service (of course, in the most general form, within the limits of the permissible norm - after all, this is foreign intelligence).

Fine. First, he worked for more than six months under the guidance of Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov. Relations were good before - both were members of the Security Council of Russia, they remained the same kind after my transfer to this service. Once, with the new head of foreign intelligence, Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov, we started talking about how I am here in my place. He replied that work calmly, you are now ours.

Of course, the new work is not as ebullient as that of the Minister of Internal Affairs - it always burns there at the same time in many places - but it has a number of its own peculiarities that need to be learned and constantly taken into account.

We wish Viktor Fedorovich Erin, as a statesman, happiness and good luck in all his future affairs. And he can serve the Fatherland for a long time. His age and state of health are quite conducive to this.

Stepan Fedorovich Apraksin The ancestor of the wealthy and well-known family of the Apraksins in Russia was a certain Solokhmir, baptized by John. He left the Golden Horde in 1371 to serve Prince Oleg of Ryazansky, married his sister Anastasia. One of John's great-grandsons was nicknamed